The Fall of the Shah: Crisis in U.S. Foreign Policy
Professor Ofira Seliktar has written that the fall of the Shah of Iran “ranks as one of the greatest setbacks to American foreign policy since World War II”. For decades the Shah existed as the United States foremost ally in the Muslim Middle-East. Iran was perceived as a stabilizing force in an area given to rapid and sometimes violent political shifts. A protector of the West’s strategic oil production and a bulwark against the Soviet Union, Iran played a critical role in the early stages of the Cold War. Yet that stability came at a price for American foreign policy. The U.S. found itself increasingly entangled in Iran’s internal political debates and tied to a leader who grew evermore authoritarian, until the late 1970s when violent opposition to the Shah thrust Iran, and the US, into open conflict with radical Islam. The Shah was overthrown and a radical cleric in exile, the Ayatollah Khomeini, returned to Iran to lead a fundamentalist revolution.[i]
How had things gone so wrong, so swiftly, and why did it seem the American diplomatic and intelligence services had been caught off guard? Answers lay in the misperceptions of internal divisions within Iran and the state of American intelligence and policymaking. The reality in Iran was far different than the perception in Washington. Additionally, foreign policy decisions and intelligence operations, dating back to the genesis of the Cold War, dramatically affected how the bureaucracy in Washington and the Iranian people viewed each other. Thus the failures of the U.S. foreign policymakers were failures of imagination- they could not see, nor did they wish to see, a crumbling monolith they had long relied upon.
Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi had ruled the Iranian monarchy since succeeding his father in 1942. Opposition to the Shah coalesced in the early 1950s behind Dr. Muhammad Mossadegh, a secular nationalist leader. Mossadegh became Prime Minister in 1951 leading a coalition of “foreign educated technocrats, clergy, leftist intellectuals, and bazaar merchants”.[ii] Mossadegh’s success was short-lived however. By 1953, his coalition failing, Mossadegh turned to the radical left and the Tudeh party for support. The Tudeh party in 1953 was a “well-funded and developed organization that maintained political ties with the Soviet Union.” This move signalled to the Eisenhower administration in Washington what they had long suspected- Mossadegh was actually a communist in disguise.[iii]
The U.S. feared an imminent Soviet coup and assisted in a British scheme to remove Mossadegh from power and restore the Shah. Operation AJAX was planned to funnel money to pro-Shah groups with the goal of fomenting resistance to, and ultimately eliminating, Mossadegh. In the face of a well-organized opposition, Mossadegh resigned and the Shah regained his authority.[iv] Professor John Stempel explains that a consensus that a “critical role” had been played “by both the United States and British governments and their operatives in Iran” became an “article of faith” among the population.[v]
The action against Mossadegh had several long-term consequences that bore upon the U.S. and the Shah beyond AJAX. First, the strong nationalist leanings within the Iranian people created a perception of a U.S. intervention and an infringement upon Iranian sovereignty. For a nation with a rich heritage of dealing with foreign adventurism such an intrusion prejudiced their view of any subsequent American actions. Second, the Shah understood the action as a complete backing from the U.S. that allowed him to pursue his consolidation of power. This required suppressing dissident voices, notably clerics who would eventually lead the revolution against him. Finally, AJAX tied the U.S. to the Shah as the central stabilizing force in the region. The easy success of AJAX skewed the perception in Washington of its own capability to affect the situation on the ground in Iran rapidly. The misperceptions drawn from the Shah’s restoration would come back to haunt the U.S. and lead to the Shah’s downfall.[vi]
A restored Shah meant the U.S. could focus its attention elsewhere in the global Cold War conflict. Any lingering fears of destabilization within Iran were eased by promises from the Shah that a modernization plan, the “White Revolution” would bring sweeping changes to the Iranian social and political landscape. During the Nixon Administration, the foreign policy known as “The Nixon Doctrine” changed how American influence would be used abroad. Rather than an American military presence in troubled spots around the world, the U.S. would instead aid economically and militarily through arms sales and technical assistance. Yet the steady increase in American manufactured weapon systems produced a shortfall in trained forces required for operating the new systems, thus an influx of American personnel was needed to train Iranians and provide other logistical support. An Iranian population predisposed to distrust Westerners, especially Americans, faced the daily presence of a large American community of military and technical experts in their midst.[vii] The White Revolution also saw the rise of SAVAK- the Shah’s secret police force. SAVAK was ruthless in its methods and its repressive tactics created further opposition to the Shah and by extension the United States, which lent training and support in the early formation of SAVAK.[viii]
The relationship between the U.S. and Iran had never been stronger according to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger who remarked, “On all major international issues, the policies of the United States and the policies of Iran have been parallel and therefore mutually reinforcing.”[ix] The commercial ties between the two nations had grown to an estimated $26 billion dollars and included the largest bilateral agreement of its kind. As the Shah’s military spending increased, his other economic reforms suffered. The White Revolution seemed a complete failure and as the Pahlavi regime increased its authoritarian control, the tight American relationship with the Shah grew more detested in Iran.[x] To Iranians, anything that appeared “western” meant “American”, and anything “American” brought back the ghosts of Mossadegh, and adventurism. By failing to understand the linkage in the minds of the Iranian people, the U.S. foreign policymakers were unable to forecast the level of animosity any American involvement, no matter how minute, would be aroused within Iran. [xi]
Economic and social reforms had given way in the late 60s and early 70s to a massive military build-up. Opposition voices were being raised in the realm of human rights. The arrival in Washington of a new president, James Earl Carter, who campaigned on placing human rights at the center of American foreign policy, gave those voices in Iran (and elsewhere) hope for change.
Carter embraced what Professor Seliktar has called “moralpolitik” and a new internationalist foreign policy “ready to usher in a new era of global moral righteousness” though a plan to “purge American foreign policy of the realpolitik of the Nixon and Ford administrations and recast it in a moralpolitik mode…through a thorough ‘cleansing’ of the foreign policy community”.[xii] The Carter foreign policy reconsidered the sale of arms beyond a set list of countries- primarily NATO allies. A State Department analysis of Iran’s human rights record delivered before the U.S. Congress reported allegations of systematic torture at the hands of SAVAK However they also reported the Shah’s denial that torture was still in use. Weighing the evidence, State recommended continuation of arms sales because they existed at “the heart of a program designed to develop a strong Iran…[and] defense of its long border with the Soviet Union.”[xiii]
Human rights issues were the initial source of discord between the Shah and the Carter administration. A lack of consistency between the Nixon-Ford administrations and Carter policies made the uneasy. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance placed the blame for the Shah’s misunderstanding of Carter on the previous administrations deference to the Shah. He had been left to his own devices for so long, the Shah saw the quite natural review process of a new presidential administration as a sign of a weakened position that played into the Shah’s “fatalistic streak”. Diplomatic disputes between the U.S. and Iran had traditionally been solved by the Shah’s weapons purchases. With the new administration, however, the Shah’s deep pockets might not be enough to assuage U.S. human rights concerns.[xiv]
To the Shah, Carter seemed to care little for the protocol to which he had become accustomed. Carter was an unknown “seemingly springing up from nowhere, with no apparent political alignment…[and] with a reputation both for devotion to his ideals and religious zeal.”[xv] The anxiety was obvious among the Shah’s inner circle. After a particularly violent outburst to his military commanders, one was quoted as saying, “If Carter wouldn’t put so much pressure on him [Pahlavi] about human rights, this wouldn’t happen.”[xvi]
Carter’s initial foreign policy agenda failed to include Iran beyond noting the Shah seemed in control and the country appeared stable. The lack of intense scrutiny over Iran dated back to the 60s. Vietnam overwhelmed the Johnson administration, and as that conflict continued into the Nixon administration, Iran took a further backseat in foreign policy. The Arab-Israeli war in 1973, the SALT II negotiations with the Soviets, and attempts to normalize relations with China consumed the Nixon administration and as long as the Shah appeared in charge little attention was paid to Iran.[xvii]
At the time of Carter’s inauguration, the national security apparatus was, in the words of Gary Sick, “stretched to the limit”. Intelligence cuts had removed much of the physical presence of operative working in Iran. Embassy personnel reductions and decreased contacts with political Iranian elites left intelligence services in Washington oblivious to the reality of the Iranian situation.[xviii]
The lack of adequate resources in the intelligence community, internal divisions within the White House were making coherent analysis impossible. What amounted to a turf war erupted over who would control intelligence assessments and decision making within the Carter administration. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski eliminated the number of personnel responsible for briefing the president on intelligence matters, opting instead to be Carter’s sole source of intelligence briefs. In doing so, Brzezinski cut the State Department (including the head of the Iran Desk) out of the decision making process. While Brzezinski viewed this as a streamlining technique the result was a singular focus of intelligence assessments. Brzezinski strayed from viewing crises in individual terms instead conflating regional turmoil, such as Iran and Afghanistan, into “part of a broad clash of interests between Moscow and Washington.”[xix]
The opposition in Iran grew in strength, initiating protests and strikes to call attention to the deteriorating economic and social conditions in the wake of the White Revolution. Reports from the few U.S. embassy personnel still stationed in Iran concerned incidents of violence against Western targets. Debates within the White House centered on what course of action to take regarding the Shah’s reforms. Several cables from the embassies in Iran reported minor acts of vandalism by the student population in Tehran, but also warned of rising anti-American sentiments across all segments of Iranian society. The reports warned that citizens were “deeply bitter about his support for the Shah whom they regard as the crux of Iran’s” problems. These contacts were amazed that Carter would believe the Shah enjoyed any popularity among his citizens.[xx]
On 15 November 1977 the Shah visited Washington for a state visit with Carter. As Carter and the Shah met with reporters on the White House lawn, a series of protests staged between anti-Shah and pro-Shah students studying in the U.S. erupted into a violent clash. Police using tear-gas to quell the riot responded quickly however the wind carried clouds of the gas to the spot where the President and the Shah were giving their remarks. The sight of Carter and the Shah dabbing their eyes was captured on camera and the remainder of the press conference was forced indoors.[xxi]
To Iranian dissident groups familiar with the repressive tactics of SAVAK, the use of force by the police was perceived as a government action by the Carter administration. Conversely, the U.S. failed to recognize the protest as a sign of the Shah’s faltering support. Only in hindsight did Secretary of State Vance see the rioting as a sign of the Shah’s weakness. Instead they viewed the viewed the violence as necessitating a firmer stand by the Shah within Iran, and American support for his authority. Brzezniski recommended the Shah use force to restore order then resume democratization efforts once calm was achieved. However many in the State Department pushed for an immediate reduction in the Shah’s authority and conciliatory moves toward opposition groups. These divisions within Carter’s advisors sent a message of ambiguity to the Shah.[xxii]
While American post-mortems of the Iran crisis are filled with finger pointing, personal reprisals, and disagreements, one point that is common is the failure of the intelligence to understand the nature of the Shah’s physical state. The Shah’s health had steadily declined since the mid-70s. French doctors diagnoses cancer, yet the Shah’s denial and avoidance of his disease had left his health status a virtual state secret. Intelligence services were completely unaware of the serious of his illness and when rumours did surface in the CIA station in Tehran they were attributed to Soviet disinformation. Without knowing the extent of the Shah’s cancer, the intelligence analysts could not accurately forecast the probability of the Shah’s reactions to forces inside and outside his government, his stamina to withstand the pressures of the opposition, or the immediacy of his possible succession.[xxiii]
As protests grew in size and frequency in Iran, on 29 October 1978, the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research predicted the collapse of the Shah’s regime within 18 months at the most. On 9 November Ambassador William Sullivan sent a telegram to Washington arguing that the time had come to begin “thinking the unthinkable.” Yet several weeks later in a New Year’s Eve visit to Tehran President Carter toasted the Shah as “an island of stability in one of the more troubled areas of the world”. There can be no clearer disconnection between intelligence analysis and policy makers than this incident. Within weeks the Shah would board a plane for a supposed holiday never to return to Iran and shortly thereafter the Ayatollah Khomeini would receive a hero’s welcome in the streets of Tehran.[xxiv]
The intelligence "shortfall" on Iran rests mainly with administrations of the 60s and early 70s who placed collection of information regarding Iran on low priority, and the lack of adequate intelligence gathering figures in Iran led to the poor intelligence estimates. Daugherty explains, "If policymakers have not asserted a need for the intelligence, and if no agency validation process has justified the expenditure of manpower and resources, no effort will be put forth to acquire that information for Washington analysts." In fact manpower was so abysmally low, "no more than five legitimate Foreign Service officers in the 1960s, and sometimes fewer in later years" served in the American embassy in Tehran. This lack of Humint is part of the breakdown in the intelligence system that plagued the Carter administration as the crisis mounted in Iran. Yet this shortfallis only a piece of the puzzle and even adequate intelligence collection and assessment may not have been able to bridge the growing chasm within the Carter White House between the State Department faction and the NSC factions. What concern existed in Washington was limited and unable to move the Carter Administration into substantive re-evaluations of policy regarding Iran.[xxv]
The rapid collapse of the Shah’s regime and the ascendancy of Khomeini exposed the fissures within the Carter administration. The Brzezniski factions believed the group demanding human rights supremacy in policy making had undermined the Shah’s grasp on power. The human rights campaigners, such as Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher, believed the pro-Shah hardliners had wasted opportunities to seek out dissident factions less militant that Khomeini.
Neither side is likely correct. There is little evidence that any faction within Iran was capable of holding power after the Shah for any lengthy period. Khomeini had become the popular successor-in-waiting, supported beyond the religious conservatives, powerful enough to dissuade the military from seeking control themselves. No American plan for mediation would have succeeded either since any American interference would have echoed Operation AJAX.
The Shah’s fall reverberated around the globe. The loss of Iran, the subsequent assault and capture of the American Embassy in Tehran, and the taking of hostages consumed the remainder of the Carter presidency. A failed rescue attempt further damaged Carter’s reputation and ultimately cost him the election of 1980. While intelligence failures were widespread throughout the Shah’s reign, the apathy and divisions within the Washington bureaucracy aided the failure to adequately predict the crisis, or to bring about a successful resolution. Administrative infighting abetted by the historical amnesia created a vacuum of knowledge as a rapidly deteriorating situation spun out of control. Iran was viewed as stable and predictable. The U.S. policymakers could not see the unravelling situation because they could not bring themselves to believe such a scenario until it was too late to stop it. The real failure then, lay in the failure of imagination.
ENDNOTES
[i] Seliktar, Ofira. Failing the Crystal Ball Test: The Carter Administration and the Fundamentalist Revolution in Iran. Wesport, Connecticut: Praegar Publishers, 2000; pg. Xv.; Gerges, Fawaz A. America and Political Islam: Clash of Cultures or Clash of Interest?” Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999; pp.42-43.
[ii] Hunt, Michael. Crises in U.S. Foreign Policy. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996; pg.368.
[iii] Bill, James A. The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988; pg.67.
[iv] Sick, Gary. All Fall Down: America’s tragic Encounter with Iran. New York: Random House, 1985; pg.7.
[v] Zabih, Sepehr. The Mossadegh Era: Roots of the Iranian Revolution. Chicago: Lake View Press, 1982; pp.124-125; Stempel, John D. Inside the Iranian Revolution. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981; pg.5.
[vi] Ledeen, Micahel and William Lewis. Debacle: The American Failure in Iran. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1981; pg.14.
[vii] Reeves, Richard. President Nixon: Alone in the White House. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001; pg. 104-105/
[viii] Daughtery, William J. In The Shadow of the Ayatollah: A CIA Hostage in Iran. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2001; pg.41; Ledeen, pg.7, 39.
[ix] National Security Archive, The Kissinger State Department Telcons Document 10: Telcon with Jack Anderson, 5 June 1975, 3:10 p.m.
[x] Stempel, pp. 7-8,41; Bill, pp. 203-204.
[xi] Saikal, Amin. The Rise and Fall of the Shah. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980; pg.183.
[xii] Seliktar, pg.48.
[xiii] Alexander, Yonah and Allan Nanes, eds. The United States and Iran: A Documentary History. Frederick, Maryland: University Publications of American, Inc., 1980; pp.429-434.
[xiv] Stempel, pp.7-8; 316-317.
[xv] Rafizadeh, Mansur. Witness. New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1987; pg.248.
[xvi] Ibid, pg.251.
[xvii] Stempel, pg.57.
[xviii] Sick, pp.65-66; Kaufman, Burton I. The Presidency of James Earl Carter, Jr. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1993; pp.123-124.
[xix] Kaufman, pg. 128.
[xx] National Security Archives, Documentation on Early Cold War U.S. Propaganda Activities in the Middle East, Document 136 and Document 137.
[xxi] Vance, Cyrus. Hard Choices. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983; pp.321-322/
[xxii] Vance, pp.322, 355-356.
[xxiii] Harris, David. The Crisis: The President, the Prophet, and the Shah- 1979 and the Coming of Militant Islam. New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2004; pp.20-21.
[xxiv] David, Charles-Phillipe. Foreign Policy Failure in the White House. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, Inc., 1993; pp.53-63.
[xxv] Daughtery, William J. “Behind the Intelligence Failure in Iran.” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence Volume 14, Number 4; October 1, 2001 (449-484).